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Wikileaks, and the Past and Present of
American Foreign Relations
Ryan Irwin

Editor’s note: An earlier version of this essay originally appeared
in Origins: Current Events in Historical Perspective, an
e-journal published by The Ohio State University, in July 2011.

O

n April 5, 2008, a small coterie of Republican
senators and diplomats—John Barrasso, Saxby
Chambliss, Mitch McConnell, and James Risch,
among others—held a quiet meeting with former
Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak at the Heliopolis
Palace in Cairo. The setting was regal. Designed in the
early twentieth century by a Belgian architect, the onetime luxury hotel had been remade as Mubarak’s home
and workplace in the 1980s. Blending Arabic, European,
and Persian architectural styles, the complex purposefully
embodied Egypt’s place at the crossroads of the panIslamic and pan-European worlds.
The conversation turned naturally to current events as
the group settled down to talk. After a brief back-andforth about Israel, Mubarak brought up Iraq. “My dear
friends,” he began, “democracy in Iraq equals killing. The
nature of those people is completely different. They are
tough and bloody, and they need a very tough leader. They
will not be submissive to a democratic leader.” Stability
required an authoritarian fist. “As I told Secretary of
Defense Gates last year,” Mubarak continued, “the only
solution [to America’s desire to leave Iraq] is to strengthen
the military and security forces, arm and train them,
wait for the emergence of some generals, don’t oppose
them, then stay in your camps in the desert and don’t
interfere. The military will control Iraq like the ayatollahs
control Iran.” Twenty-eight years in power, and Mubarak’s
worldview amounted to a simple adage: never “mix
democracy and tribalism.”1
The transcript drips with irony now. It was sent to the
Department of State by U.S. Ambassador Margaret Scobey
on April 8, 2008, and it comes to us via Private First Class
Bradley Manning, who at present sits in isolation in a
Marine Corps jail in Quantico, Virginia, awaiting trial for
passing along 251,287 such cables—only 2,000 of which
are available online currently—to the media organization
known as Wikileaks. Manning’s fate and the imbroglio
surrounding Julian Assange, the controversial figure who
shared the cables with the world, has faded somewhat
from the headlines in recent months. Yet the Wikileaks
communiqués reveal much about America’s role in today’s
world. In the words of author Timothy Garton Ash, the
documents are a “historian’s dream” and a “diplomat’s
nightmare”—a spigot of information from the contact
points of American power, where powerbrokers and
diplomats go daily through the motions of statecraft.2
Leaks, Yesterday and Today
In the United States, politicians hyperventilated over
the Wikileaks story after it broke in 2010. Despite the fact
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that most foreign leaders quickly dismissed the material
as insignificant, American leaders portrayed Assange and
Manning as unambiguous enemies of the international
community.3 Internal dissent—voiced notably by (now
former) State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley,
who criticized the U.S. government’s imprisonment of
Manning—was cast as inexcusable and irresponsible.
However, the American ship of state has leaked since
the republic’s founding. George Washington reprimanded
Alexander Hamilton for passing material to the British
during the 1794 Jay Treaty negotiations, and James
Madison once castigated his secretary of state for giving
administration secrets to members of the opposing
Federalist Party. Since then, there has been no shortage of
leak-related precedents. In 1848, as the United States’ war
with Mexico drew to a close, Senate investigators placed
a journalist under house arrest for the first time because
he refused to disclose how he obtained details about the
not-yet-complete peace treaty. At the height of the First
World War, lawmakers considered making it illegal to leak
state information to the public, but changed their minds
because of first amendment concerns, opting instead for
legislation that criminalized the act of relaying defense
secrets to the enemy during wartime.
The most notorious leak in U.S. history came in the
early 1970s, when Daniel Ellsberg, a Princeton-educated
analyst who worked for Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara during the 1960s, delivered a seven-thousandpage Pentagon report to the New York Times, and later the
Washington Post. Unprecedented in scope, the collection
of top-secret materials revealed that Lyndon Johnson’s
White House had lied systematically to the public about
the rationale behind America’s involvement in Vietnam.
Richard Nixon tried to use an injunction to stop the
material’s publication in 1971, setting another historical
precedent in the process, but failed at the Supreme Court.
The ethics of leaking have never been straightforward.
Nixon’s own contradictions were on full display as he and
his advisors formulated their response to Ellsberg:
Nixon: “Let’s get the son of a bitch into jail.”
Henry Kissinger: “We’ve got to get him.”
Nixon: “We’ve got to get him. . . . Don’t worry
about his trial. Just get everything out. Try him
in the press. . . . Everything . . . that there is on
the investigation, get it out, leak it out.”
Such conviction, of course, facilitated Nixon’s undoing,
but the implications were clear and the sentiment was
probably felt widely among American elites: leaking
was bad when it violated the interests of power. Or, as
columnist David Corn said once, there are leaks “that
serve the truth, and those that serve the leaker.”4
The second Bush administration blurred this line
frequently. White House staff members gave the identity
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of CIA agent Valerie Plame to columnist Robert Novak
after her husband, Ambassador Joseph Wilson, criticized
the rationale for the 2003 Iraq invasion, and Bush himself
passed along (selectively chosen) top-secret documents to
reporter Bob Woodward for the 2002 book, Bush at War.
Wheat from the Chaff
Each of these leaks tells a different historical story. The
Plame affair underscored the politicization of information
in our fractured age, when partisans compete with cynical
glee to mold Washington’s weekly narrative. Ellsberg’s
papers exposed the contradictions of an earlier epoch,
highlighting the tenuous underpinnings of the global
Cold War, particularly in Southeast Asia. Controversies
from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—often
sharpened by war and codified through law—offer
windows into the rise of the modern state and highlight
how the U.S. government came to police its inner
correspondence. And the experiences of the founding
fathers hint at an era when leaders navigated questions of
secrecy with little consideration of bureaucratic power.
So given this long leaky history, what makes the
Wikileaks material so interesting? Size matters (there
is a lot of information in the 251,287 cables), but these
documents are also different. For one thing, they draw
on unusual source material. Unlike Ellsberg, Manning
did not have access to top-secret reports. Most of the
information he downloaded from his desk at a military
base in Iraq never reached the Oval Office. It is likely
that few of his cables even made their way to the seventh
floor of the U.S. State Department, where America’s
top statesmen manage the daily business of U.S.
foreign relations. Moreover, the documents do not lend
themselves to a Plame or Ellsberg-like controversy. There
are embarrassing tidbits here and there (mostly gossipy
assessments of foreign leaders) and heart-wrenching
details from the battlefields in Afghanistan and Iraq.
But for the most part Washington’s foreign officers come
across as professionals. As commentator Fareed Zakaria
opined, “Washington’s secret diplomacy is actually
remarkably consistent with its public diplomacy” this
time around, unlike during the Vietnam War, and U.S.
diplomats are undeniably “sharp, well informed, and
lucid.”5
What emerges from the Wikileaks material is a story
that features not the great men and women of Washington
but the mid-level officials who work in U.S. outposts
around the world. These are the individuals who conduct
American diplomacy on the ground. Their correspondence
is dominated neither by turf battles nor policy debates but
rather by a continual effort to collect accurate information,
analyze trends, and advance U.S. interests in the world.
Looking through the eyes of such individuals reveals
much about U.S. foreign relations, especially in that zone
of exchange at the outskirts of Washington’s political
influence. The Wikileaks documents showcase the
common priorities of the officials who enact American
policy in this region, and they tell scholars something
about the challenges of U.S. foreign affairs in the early
twenty-first century. Things have certainly changed since
the end of the Cold War, but they haven’t changed as
much as one might expect.
Small States, Big Allies
Washington’s global influence today is deeply contested.
To a degree that might surprise both boosters and
detractors of America’s foreign policy, negotiation is the
motif of the Wikileaks documents. Whether dealing with
special friends or political afterthoughts, U.S. diplomats
rarely dictate the terms of international exchange. They’re
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caught instead in a continual two-way conversation that
often obfuscates the asymmetrical nature of Washington’s
military and economic resources.
The examples are almost endless. Consider Yemen.
Residing at the outskirts of the Arab world with a harsh
climate and a small population, the country should
not possess any leverage over the U.S. policymaking
establishment. Unlike Saudi Arabia, it has neither oil
reserves nor regional clout—only the strategic port city
of Aden, which provides access to the waters between the
Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. But the Wikileaks material
shows how Yemen’s president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, pushed
Washington to take a greater interest in his country in
recent years. “If you don’t help, [Yemen] will become
worse than Somalia,” he told America’s ambassador in
September 2009. The threat proved remarkably effective.
Between 2009 and 2011, the United States tripled aid to
Yemen, providing over $300 million in military equipment
and security assistance.
U.S. diplomats on the ground acknowledged that Saleh
was using these funds for personal reasons. His principal
aim, quite logically, was to strengthen his government’s
position vis-à-vis rebels in the north and secessionists
in the south. (Yemen’s borders have long been contested,
and religious and ethnic tensions have simmered since
the country took its current form in 1990.) However,
Washington was willing to overlook Saleh’s diversion of
funds as long as he remained an ally in the fight against
terrorism.
The resulting situation has been rife with contradictions.
The Wikileaks material proves that the U.S. military
attained almost unfettered access to Yemeni territory
after 2009. Until last year, American warships and
aircraft were bombarding training facilities linked to
foreign groups such as al-Qaeda, and U.S. advisors were
working in various capacities with local military and
police forces. However, Saleh shaped the trajectory of
these interventions. In a 2010 meeting with General David
Petraeus, the president proposed to “continue saying the
[U.S.] bombs are ours, not yours” as long as American
officials promised not to punish him personally for
future terrorist acts and recognized his domestic enemies
as terrorist sympathizers. Such statements would be
bound to anger Yemenis, to whom U.S. actions must feel
suspiciously like old-fashioned imperialism.
According to the U.S. ambassador, Saleh understood
exactly what he was doing. “The net effect” of the
arrangement, “and one we strongly suspect Saleh has
calculated,” was an “iron fist” approach toward the
president’s enemies at home and interlopers from abroad.
Moreover, by capitalizing on Washington’s anxieties,
Saleh buttressed his defense budget while outsourcing
counterterrorist operations to the United States,
effectively giving him the political space and financial
resources to address his real problem: anti-government
unrest. Although Saleh fled to Saudi Arabia to receive
treatment for injuries he sustained during an attack on
his compound in June 2011, he returned to his country in
September. His hold on power is tenuous.
Perusing the Wikileaks material, one can unearth
situations similar to that of Yemen elsewhere in the
Middle East and throughout Africa, Asia, and Latin
America. Small states, or at least the politicians who sit at
the interface of the international community and Third
World conflict zones, influence how the U.S. government
engages the world.6 Washington’s military might is
unquestioned and often omnipresent, but this power
functions through intermediaries on the ground and these
individuals rarely possess the same agenda as official
Washington. In fact, they often turn U.S. strategic interests
to their advantage.
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Irony of Strategy
This state of affairs should come as no surprise. A
similar dynamic defined America’s stance abroad during
the Cold War. Although the containment strategy no
longer governs the rhetoric and practice of U.S. foreign
relations, it allowed small states to influence the form
that American power took in the world. Originally
promulgated by George Kennan in the late 1940s,
containment defined America’s foreign engagements
throughout the second half of the twentieth century, at
least theoretically. Europe—Germany in particular—
initially anchored the idea. Moscow’s desire to prevent a
Fourth Reich clashed fundamentally with Washington’s
plan to reintegrate Germany into the newly formed United
Nations. For Kennan and others, containment enabled
America to address this dispute without losing sight of the
postwar world’s true pivots—Western Europe and Japan.
These were the places where Moscow’s influence had to be
denied.
How then did containment become a global doctrine?
Some scholars blame overly aggressive Washingtonians,
but context and external actors mattered tremendously.
America’s European and Japanese allies relied on markets
and raw materials in the Middle East, North Africa, and
Southeast Asia—regions outside the traditional scope of
U.S. power. As communists began establishing areas of
influence beyond Europe, with Mao Zedong’s Communist
Party taking control of China and Josef Stalin exploding
an atomic bomb in Central Asia, fear pushed containment
beyond Western Europe and Japan—fear that communists
would gain further footholds in the Third World and fear
that Washington’s allies would tire of the benefits of U.S.
patronage. Politicians abroad understood the possibilities
of this new mindset. As colonial rule collapsed, Europeans
and non-Europeans alike began to court the United States,
often with guile and sophistication, trading friendship
and local resources for money and military equipment.
Consider the case of Pakistan. Washington’s 1954
decision to give security support to Islamabad rather
than New Delhi makes little sense against the backdrop
of India’s regional clout. Yet the United States found itself
persuaded by Pakistan’s threats of Soviet incursions
and strident assurances that it would be an unwavering
bulwark against communism in Asia. The result was
a slow-moving Cold War debacle, with U.S. diplomats
dragged inexorably into a series of countervailing
commitments that alienated India and frustrated Pakistan
while draining American coffers and arming opponents in
South Asia.
Or consider the Philippines. Whereas U.S. planners
hoped to remake the country in the image of liberal
capitalism in the 1950s, the Philippine government
sought, first and foremost, to use U.S. aid to build client
relationships at the local level. Whenever Washington
threatened to withdraw aid, Manila raised the specter of
communist insurrection. By the time Ferdinand Marcos
came to power in 1965, the status quo was set: the United
States maintained access to its military bases and the
Philippines retained control of its crony capitalist system.
The quagmire in Vietnam also dramatized the influence
of external actors on U.S. foreign relations. American
diplomats had little interest in Southeast Asia at the
beginning of the Cold War, and most officials recognized
the region as unimportant to U.S. interests. Nonetheless,
London and Paris managed to pull Washington down the
slippery slope of economic and military aid during the late
1940s and 1950s by actively policing information about Ho
Chi Minh and exaggerating the menace of communism.
The result was a self-fulfilling prophecy, with the Viet
Minh radicalized by resurgent French colonialism and
America committed to the invented nation of South
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Vietnam—a commitment that culminated, of course, in
the Second Indochina War.
Containment both rationalized and justified
Washington’s growing engagements abroad. But foreign
actors—not only Washington policymakers—dictated
how, when, and where containment was applied.
Cognizant of the benefits of U.S. aid, local elites tapped
into American anxieties purposefully, pushing the United
States in particular directions while pursuing goals that
diverged from Washington’s own aims. Their actions do
not absolve the U.S. government of responsibility for its
actions. Once committed to a country and its leaders, the
United States frequently pursued goals with Manichean
zeal, and its actions in Guatemala, Iran, and Chile should
not be excused. Nor do those actions call into question
the importance of rhetoric. Once employed, containment’s
logic morphed invariably in unexpected directions, and
foreign suitors rarely walked away satisfied from their
engagements with the United States.
From Communism to Terrorism
But the basic point remains: today’s situation is
not unique. Saleh is merely the latest in a long line of
astute intermediaries who have pulled Washington
closer to the periphery by exchanging friendship for
money. Perhaps the true story of Wikileaks, then, is one
of historical continuity. The Cold War is over, but the
processes that shaped American foreign relations in the
early twentieth century are remarkably familiar. What
is unique today is the way that counterterrorism frames
the discursive landscape of U.S. diplomacy. The second
Bush administration made no secret of its desire to recast
America’s grand strategy around the war on terror after
September 11, and Barack Obama’s White House—while
opposed ardently to unilateral intervention—has done
little to alter the fundamental logic of these efforts. The
effect has not been the rise of a new world order but the
amplification and acceleration of older trends.
Whether summarizing the state of U.S.–Macedonia
relations or surveying events in Russia, U.S. embassy
officials fixate daily on information about terrorist
behavior, reiterating rumors passed along invariably by
liaisons on the ground.7 Containment gave U.S. diplomats
an opponent in the Soviet Union, but this new fight
against terror is without political direction. The reports
speak for themselves. In October 2008, a vehicle with
Iranian license plates parked outside the U.S. embassy
in Azerbaijan for nearly an hour, driving off only when
a man entered the car; a few days later an individual
stood on a street corner near the American Institute in
Taiwan, videotaping numerous buildings in the area
before departing abruptly on a motor scooter.8 The
disconnected scenes flow to Washington every day, like a
twenty-first-century retelling of J.M. Coetzee’s Waiting for
the Barbarians (1982). And no country—no person, for that
matter—appears too obscure for Washington’s watchful
eye. Writing from the sleepy archipelago of the Maldives
in 2008, U.S. officials relayed that local police had given
the embassy the name of a young man who might have
recently met with a Waziristan group with unspecified
links to al-Qaeda. Little was known of the man beyond
the fact that he had visited a website associated with
radical Islam—but his name was entered dutifully into a
terrorist database, along with a solemn rejoinder about the
potential dangers of Maldives-based, Waziristan-trained
extremists.9
How is it possible to police the line between America’s
vital and peripheral interests in such a world? Everything
and everyone matters to Washington in the twenty-first
century. The story of Wikileaks is defined by continuity—
and it hints at how the American geopolitical tradition
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has arced further downward since the end of the Cold
War. Although the material leaked by Manning tells us
relatively little about the top-level debates in the Bush
and Obama administrations, the cables convey neither a
sense of proportion nor humility. Nowhere was there an
awareness of how distance and terrain affect international
affairs in different ways around the world—or a
cognizance that Yemen (and regions like it) simply do not
matter to the United States.
Saying No
Today, as in the past, small states appropriate American
rhetoric. They lay claim to the language of U.S. foreign
affairs and push U.S. powerbrokers in particular
directions by conflating their own goals with America’s
stated strategic priorities. Those who insist that America
has lost its “influence” around the world seem not to
understand this history. Our world is interconnected
in novel ways, and new technologies pose threats and
opportunities that are at once terrifying and exhilarating.
But old lessons are worth heeding. The most important
of these: not every region matters equally. And the most
important task of every great power, now and yesterday, is
saying no. It is a lesson worth reflecting on, especially as
diplomats and policymakers adjust to a political landscape
without such mainstays as Hosni Mubarak.
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CALL FOR PROPOSALS TO HOST THE 2013
SHAFR SUMMER INSTITUTE
The SHAFR Summer Institute Oversight Committee welcomes proposals to host the
2013 SHAFR Summer Institute.
The SHAFR Summer Institute (SI) takes place during the week prior to the annual SHAFR meetings in June.
(In 2013, the SI should ideally run on June 14-19, preceding the annual meeting in Arlington VA, on June
20-22). The SI is intended to provide advanced graduate students and/or junior faculty with the chance
to engage in intense discussion with senior scholars on topics and methodologies related to the study of
foreign policy and/or international history. The Institute also serves as an opportunity for all participants,
senior scholars included, to test ideas and themes related to their own research. To underwrite the Institute,
SHAFR provides $45,000, which includes a $5,000 stipend for each of the two co-organizers; a small
stipend, travel, and room expenses for the participants; and other costs. Organizers are encouraged to seek
additional funding, either by subsidies or in-kind support, from their home institutions. Prior Institutes
and their themes have been: “War and Foreign Policy: America’s Conflicts in Vietnam and Iraq in Historical
Perspective;” “Turning Points in the Cold War;” “Decisions and History;” “Freedom and Free Markets: The
Histories of Globalization and Human Rights;” and “Does Culture Matter? The Emotions, the Senses, and
Other New Approaches to the History of US Foreign/International Relations.” Those interested in applying
to host in 2013 should prepare a proposal including (1) title of the Institute they wish to conduct; (2) brief
description (one paragraph) of the themes to be pursued during the Institute; (3) preferred audience (grad
students or junior faculty); (4) a statement on funding secured from home institutions, if any; and (5) contact
information and c.v. of the co-organizers. Proposals should be sent to shafr@osu.edu by
May 1, 2012. Questions can be directed to Peter L. Hahn, Executive Director, at Hahn.29@osu.edu.
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